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CHAPTER 7
ABSTRACT
Global value chains make it easier for developing countries 
to move away from export reliance on unprocessed primary 
products to become exporters of manufactures and services. 
Global value chains (GVCs) allow countries to specialize in a 
particular activity and join a global production network. As a 
developing country moves from export of primary products 
to export of manufactures and services via GVCs, the ratio 
of domestic value added to gross export value tends to fall. 
Many developing country policy-makers worry about this 
trend and aspire to increase their value added contribution 
to exports. There are a number of reasons why this objective 
is not good policy. It may seem like simple math that a higher 
domestic value added share means more total value added 
exported and hence more GDP. But that simple idea ignores 
the reality that imported goods and services are a key sup-
port to a country’s competitiveness. The chapter documents 
this via the history of the successful East Asian industrializers 
as well as more recent evidence from Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies. If a country artifi-
cially replaces key inputs with inferior domestic versions, the 
end result is likely to be fewer gross exports and less, not 
more, total value added exports.
Should high domestic value added in 
exports be an objective of policy?
David Dollar (Brookings Institution), Bilal Khan (RCGVC-UIBE), and Jiansuo Pei (SITE-UIBE)
• In almost all countries, developed and developing alike, the share of domestic value added in 
exports has tended to trend downwards recently. This reflects the expansion of global value chains.
• Many developing countries worry about this phenomenon and aspire to increase their value-added 
contribution to exports. This objective should be approached cautiously. Imported goods and 
services are a key support to a country’s competitiveness. If a country artificially replaces key inputs 
with inferior domestic versions, the result is likely to be fewer gross exports and fewer, not more, 
total value-added exports.
• China’s recent experience is often given as an important counter-example, since its domestic value-
added ratio has been rising over the past decade, but our research indicates that this trend is 
primarily the result of technological advances in China.
• Consequently, the Chinese ratio can be expected to peak and later decline if China further opens up 
and follows in the steps of other earlier Asian industrializers, such as Japan and the Republic of Korea.
142 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
1. Introduction
G lobal value chains make it easier for developing countries to move away from export reliance on unprocessed primary products to become exporters of manufactures and services. Before the develop-
ment of GVCs, a country had to master the production of a whole 
product in order to export it. GVCs allow countries to specialize 
in a particular activity and join a global production network. As 
a developing country moves from export of primary products 
to export of manufactures and services via GVCs, the ratio of 
domestic value added to gross export value tends to fall. Devel-
oping countries often start out at the end of value chains, with 
labor-intensive assembly of parts produced elsewhere. For some 
individual products the ratio of domestic value added to gross 
export value can be very small, maybe only a few percentage 
points. The gross exports from the country can be very large, but 
this is an artifact of the position in the value chain. The country’s 
value added contribution to the export is much smaller. Many 
developing countries worry about this phenomenon and aspire 
to increase their value added contribution to exports. There are 
a number of reasons why this objective should be approached 
cautiously. It may seem like simple math that a higher domes-
tic value added share means more total value added exported 
and hence more GDP. But that simple idea ignores the reality 
that imported goods and services are a key support to a coun-
try’s competitiveness. If a country artificially replaces key inputs 
with inferior domestic versions, the end result is likely to be fewer 
gross exports and less, not more, total value added exports.
In this chapter we examine this issue. Section 2 looks at the 
historical experience of the successful East Asian industrializers, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Chinese Taipei. Section 3 then 
focuses on the more recent experience of ASEAN economies as 
well as general literature on the issue of domestic value added 
content of exports. Section 4 looks at policy measures that econ-
omies can consider in order to move up the technological ladder. 
In general, artificially trying to boost domestic content is going 
to be a losing strategy. Countries would do better to focus on 
human capital development, support to R&D, intellectual prop-
erty rights protection, and opening up remaining closed sectors 
of the economy, especially services.
2. The decline of domestic value added in 
exports in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and 
Chinese Taipei
After two decades of dedicated work among international 
economists in measuring international fragmentation, a consen-
sus has more or less formed, that the trend of domestic value 
added in exports is declining. Starting from autarky, when the 
economy opens to trade, there are several reasons why the 
domestic content of exports would begin to decline. Opening 
up to imports of intermediate goods and services means that a 
country’s producers have access to the most competitive inputs 
and will make use of some of them. The decline in the share of 
domestic value added in exports in many cases is also the result 
of structural change in the export basket. Economies that open 
up after an autarkic period often start by exporting primary 
products, which tend to be relatively homogeneous worldwide. 
Manufactures produced in closed economies are low-quality and 
find few markets. Over time, however, with openness to imported 
inputs, a competitive manufacturing sector may emerge. China, 
Mexico, and Viet Nam are all examples of economies that initially 
exported primary products after opening up, but soon moved to 
manufacturing exports. That structural shift will tend to reduce 
the domestic content share of overall exports because that share 
is generally higher for primary products and lower for manu-
factures. So, in general, we observe a declining domestic value 
added ratio over time. Further, this indicator does not have direct 
welfare implication, so it is not appropriate to formulate policies 
around pursuing a higher domestic content ratio in exports.
In this section we examine historical data for three indus-
trializing economies in East Asia to study the development of 
domestic content in exports. We proceed in three steps of analy-
sis, namely the aggregate trend for the total economy, the trend 
for manufacturing products, and the trend for the electronics 
industry, a high-tech sector.1
2.1 The case of Japan
For Japan, annual input-output tables date back to 1973. It is evi-
dent that the domestic content in overall exports has declined, 
decreasing roughly 0.12 points from 1973 through 2014 (Figure 
7.1). Several factors may account for this decline. It can be seen 
that the domestic value-added ratio (DVAR) in manufactures is 
always below that of total exports, reflecting differences between 
FIGURE 7.1 Domestic value added in Japanese exports
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manufactures and primary products. The latter have relatively 
few intermediate inputs, and hence few imported inputs. The 
structural shift away from primary exports towards manufactured 
exports would pull down the DVAR in overall exports. In addition, 
various waves of trade liberalization gave Japanese producers 
better access to imported goods and services for production.
Clearly, this decline trend is more pronounced for manufac-
tured products, as well as for the high-tech electronics sector, 
especially after 1990 when Japan’s serious trade liberalization 
accelerated. The general pattern is similar, while the ratio for 
manufacturing products and electronics are much lower than 
the aggregate. In addition, they decrease 0.19 and 0.15, respec-
tively, comparing with 0.12 for the aggregate value. Arguably, 
the expanding international production fragmentation is well 
observed in Japan’s case. It is also notable that electronics is the 
most high-technology sector, and here Japan’s domestic value 
added in less than 40% of the gross export value in the most 
recent year. Thus, success in the high-tech sector goes hand-in-
hand with extensive use of imported inputs and services. 
2.2 The case of the Republic of Korea
For the Republic of Korea, annual input-output tables date back 
to 1985. It is observed that the aggregate ratio of the domestic 
content in exports declined, with most of the change since 1995 
(Figure 7.2). Between 1995 and 2014 the ratio dropped roughly 
0.15. Next, we observed that the decline was similar for manu-
factured products; while the general pattern is similar, the ratio 
for manufacturing products is much lower than the aggregate. 
DVAR for aggregate exports was about 0.55 in the most recent 
year, compared to less than 0.40 for manufactures. The trend for 
the electronics sector is similar.
As in Japan’s case, several factors may account for the decline 
in the ratio of domestic value added to export value, such as the 
continuing trade liberalization, international production frag-
mentation, and structural shift from primary exports to manufac-
tures. As with Japan, the DVAR in electronics is particularly low. 
The Republic of Korea has very successfully developed its own 
brands in televisions and smartphones, yet the DVAR in elec-
tronics has generally been below 40%. The Republic of Korea’s 
success results from combining domestic value added with 
imported components and services.
2.3 The case of Chinese Taipei
For Chinese Taipei, annual input-output tables date back to 1960s, 
and the domestic content of exports peaked in 1969 with a ratio of 
roughly 79 percent (Figure 7.3). Domestic content has fallen sharply 
over time, reaching 48 percent in 2011. Hence, the overall decline 
was around 30 percentage points (comparing with the world aver-
age ratio of value added to exports falling by roughly 10 percent-
age points, as reported in Johnson and Noguera, 2016), which is 
remarkable. Different from its Asian peers such as Japan and the 
Republic of Korea, Chinese Taipei is a typical small open economy. 
Given the growth of international production fragmentation, along 
with Chinese Taipei’s steady trade liberalization, it is expected that 
the ratio of domestic content to exports would see a sharp decline.
As a strategy for the developing regions to integrate into the 
world economy, joining global production is one of the shortcuts. 
This is particularly true for small open economies. In this way, the 
domestic industry structure is no longer a prerequisite for produc-
ing internationally competitive products, as they can specialize in 
some particular stage of production, e.g. processing and assembly 
activities. 
FIGURE 7.2 Domestic value added in Korean exports
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FIGURE 7.3 Domestic value added in exports of Chinese Taipei
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3. Developing countries’ experience of joining 
GVCs
This section will analyze the recent experiences of develop-
ing countries by comparing the domestic value-added (DVA) in 
exports and its implications for the labor market. In the last few 
decades, we have noticed that many developing countries have 
been joining at the lower end of the value chain and have been 
able to increase their gross exports, achieve higher GDP per 
capita growth, and generate employment opportunities despite 
the reduction in DVA in gross exports. However, the policymakers 
in some of these economies are now targeting to increase the DVA 
in gross exports by using tariff and non-tariff barriers to imported 
inputs. They believe that the best way to utilize the exporting 
activity for development is by increasing the DVA content in gross 
exports as it will create more and better job opportunities for 
domestic workers, given everything else remains constant.
Figure 7.4 compares the ASEAN exports in 1995 and 2011. 
From 1995 to 2011, DVA share in exports dropped from 71% to 
67%, though, it can be seen that the absolute value of exports 
increased many folds. Much of this increase has been attributed 
to increase in the intermediate exports i.e. exports related 
to the GVCs. This tremendous increase in gross exports also 
led to remarkable growth in jobs. Using empirical evidence, 
Lopez-Gonzalez (2016) has shown that the foreign value-added, 
in form of intermediate imports as well as services, plays a sig-
nificantly positive role in enhancing the employment as well as 
productivity (value-added per worker) in the ASEAN countries. 
Intuitively, importing better quality intermediates as well as ser-
vices, increases the competitiveness of the domestic firms in the 
international market and leads to higher demand for the product 
as well as employees in exporting sector.
There is no single strategy that works for every economy. 
Each country has to realize the economic activity that can be 
integrated into the GVCs. Figure 7.5 shows backward and for-
ward GVC linkages for Asian economies in 1995 and 2011. Viet 
Nam, for example, has increased the backward linkages, that 
is, the use of imported goods and services in its production 
of exports. Viet Nam has primarily participated at the produc-
tion and assembly stage of manufacturing sector (light man-
ufacturing, electrical equipment, electronics etc.) in the GVCs. 
Viet Nam’s DVA share in gross exports fell from 79.1% to 63.7% 
during this period. During the same period, GDP per capita in 
Viet Nam increased from $288 in 1995 to more than $1500 in 
2011. Viet Nam has been able to shift a significant proportion 
of workers from the relatively less productive agricultural sector 
to the more productive manufacturing and services sectors. This 
remarkable progress has been achieved by embracing trade and 
investment openness by signing a Bilateral Trade Agreement 
with USA in 2002 and joining the WTO in 2007. These agree-
ments encouraged Viet Nam to reduce the import tariffs and 
improve infrastructure to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). 
These policies resulted in importing better quality inputs as well 
as related services and focusing on the stage of production (pri-
marily assembling and processing) where the Vietnamese firms/
workers have comparative advantage. In 2017, nearly a third of 
FIGURE 7.4 Enjoying a smaller share of bigger pie, ASEAN exports
Value added content of exports (share) Value added content of exports (Value in billion USD)
71.4% 66.6%
28.6% 33.4%
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1995 2011
224.5
798.6
89.8
401
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1995 2011
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Source: Lopez-Gonzalez (2016).
Should high domestic value added in exports be an objective of policy? • 145
the Viet Nam’s exports as well as imports consisted of electrical 
and electronics equipment despite having a shortage of skilled 
workers in the labor force. This has been possible only by joining 
the GVCs in electronics and electrical equipment.
In contrast, Indonesia has not seen much change in backward 
linkages since 1995 as its specialization lies in natural resources 
and hence, it has strengthened its forward linkages since then. 
Indonesia joined the global value chains in relatively upstream 
industries. Indonesia’s GDP per capita has also grown three 
times during the same period, though, this phenomenal growth 
has come through forward linkages in GVC participation. We can 
also notice that most of the other countries in ASEAN followed a 
similar pattern of achieving higher growth in GDP per capita as 
well as exports related to the GVCs.
Figure 7.6 shows that the share of foreign value added in 
gross exports of the domestic economy is not only increasing 
through importing more intermediate products but also through 
utilizing foreign services in exports. These foreign service pro-
viders, being much more efficient than the domestic providers, 
also play a significant role in enhancing the competitiveness of 
the exports. It must be emphasized that different economies in 
ASEAN entered at different stages of GVCs and specialized in 
different industries (or possibly within the same industry but at 
different stages of production) based on the comparative advan-
tage of the domestic economy. Most of the ASEAN economies 
have integrated well into the regional as well as global value 
chains depending on the relative comparative advantage of the 
domestic economy. This integration helped these economies 
to achieve much higher GDP growth and create millions of job 
opportunities for their workers and helped a significant propor-
tion of the population to lift out of poverty.
In order to highlight the implications of directly targeting 
the DVA in exports as a national policy for development, we 
can compare Bangladesh and Pakistan’s approach towards the 
exports in the textile and clothing sector. The biggest exports 
of both countries have been textiles and clothing. In 1990, Ban-
gladesh’s exports ($1.09 bn) were a third of Pakistan’s exports 
($3.5 bn) in textiles and clothing. Since then, Pakistan, being a 
cotton producer, incentivized the textile producers to use the 
local inputs and export the finished products. Bangladesh, 
mostly importing the raw materials for textile and clothing, 
focused more on the trade reforms and opening up the economy 
to foreign investors. Bangladesh integrated its textile and cloth-
ing sector in the global value chains, sourcing most of the raw 
material from abroad and exporting readymade garments to the 
developed world. This helped Bangladesh to slowly convert its 
comparative advantage in clothing into competitive advantage 
over time by using better quality inputs as well as foreign ser-
vices by collaborating with the leading garments manufacturers. 
In 2016, Pakistan’s textile and clothing exports ($12.4 bn) were 
less than half of Bangladesh’s exports ($28.3 bn).2 Using John-
son (2018), we can calculate the DVA in the Textile and Clothing 
sector for these two economies in 2014.3 Bangladesh’s DVA in 
the Textile and Clothing sector was 64.5% as compared to 80.3% 
for Pakistan.4 It can be seen that Bangladesh’s exports have risen 
much faster as compared to Pakistan despite having lower DVA 
in exports. As the labor costs are rising in China, many garment 
producers might look for opportunities abroad to relocate their 
plants. Bangladesh, being well integrated into the GVCs in tex-
tile and clothing, the second biggest exporter of garments and 
offering lower wages, will be the first choice of these firms to 
relocate. The textile and garment sector in Bangladesh has also 
FIGURE 7.5 GVC participation in Factory Asia
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helped to achieve twice the female labor force participation rate 
as that of India and Pakistan as nearly 85% workers are females 
in this sector. Bangladesh’s GDP per capita also surpassed Paki-
stan’s GDP per capita in 2017.
Another good example of the contrast between global inte-
gration and import substitution comes from the auto sector in 
Malaysia and Thailand, neighboring countries at similar stages 
of development. Malaysia tried to develop an indigenous auto 
industry and a national champion brand through protectionist 
policies, whereas Thailand strove to join GVCs around existing 
brands by attracting FDI from Japanese and American compa-
nies. Thailand’s strategy enabled it to integrate into successful 
value chains and become a significant exporter of auto value 
added, primarily via parts. Malaysia’s effort did not produce a 
globally competitive car and eventually had to be abandoned 
(Wad 2009). 
All the examples discussed above suggest that participation 
and integration into the GVCs help the economies to improve 
their trade competitiveness, achieve higher GDP per capita 
growth and improve female labor force participation despite fall-
ing DVA in gross exports. Global technological advancement as 
well as falling trading costs have resulted in the fragmentation of 
production across borders. This reduction in trade costs helps 
the firms to exploit the comparative advantage of each country 
in the specific stage of production and hence, there is a reduc-
tion in DVA in gross exports. The only country that has been 
able to buck the trend of global decline in DVA in gross exports 
despite increasing GDP per capita as well as rising exports has 
been China. China has been able to increase the DVA in exports 
as well as achieve higher GDP growth rate since joining WTO. 
Tang et al. (2018) have suggested that the substantial improve-
ment in technology in China, along with falling trade costs, have 
been the reason for the rising DVA in gross exports recently. 
China has also invested hugely in improving human capital in 
the last two decades to complement the advanced technology 
adoption by Chinese firms. Though, as we can see from the 
experiences of the Republic of Korea and Japan, this might be a 
short-lived phenomenon. Once the Chinese economy catches up 
in technology with other economies and achieves the maximum 
DVA in exports, rising labor costs and stringent environmental 
standards might push the firms to outsource the low value added 
segment in production to the other regions in the world to main-
tain competitiveness by the exporting firms.
The regional experiences within China provide some addi-
tional perspective on the relationship between DVA and level of 
development. Across Chinese provinces there is an inverted-U 
shape relationship in which DVA tends to rise with per capita 
GDP and then decline beyond a certain threshold (Figure 7.7). In 
general, the richest provinces in China have low ratios of domes-
tic value added to exports. Beijing and Shanghai have particu-
larly low ratios. But the export powerhouse of Guangdong also 
has a low domestic value-added ratio, and hence a high ratio 
of imported inputs. This is consistent with the view that export 
success requires access to the best inputs in terms of manu-
factured parts and supporting services. As more Chinese prov-
inces develop in the direction of the already successful ones, the 
national ratio of domestic value added to gross exports is likely 
to fall.
FIGURE 7.6 Service content of exports in Factory Asia
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These results have also been supported by the empirical anal-
ysis for other developing countries in the literature. Using the 
manufacturing firms’ data from Indonesia, Amiti and Konings 
(2007) find that a 10% reduction in import (input) tariffs would 
lead to 12% productivity gains for the importing firms, at least 
twice as high as gains from reducing the output (final goods) 
tariffs. Interestingly, Goldberg et al. (2010) show that removing 
(or lowering) the import tariffs on newer inputs also assists the 
domestic firms to introduce newer products. They show that the 
lower input tariffs accounts for an average of 31 percent of the 
newer products introduced by domestic firms in India. Kugler 
and Verhoogen (2012) study the impact of quality of inputs and 
outputs on the plant size, in terms of employment, for Colom-
bian manufacturing sector. They found that the more productive 
plants use higher-quality imported inputs as indicated by com-
paring the price of domestic input in the same category by the 
same plant. They also showed that there is positive correlation 
between the quality of inputs and the plant size and the price of 
the output, an indicator of quality of the product. Since reducing 
the import tariffs on intermediates will help the firms to import 
higher quality inputs, it will also help to increase the employ-
ment in the plant, along with improving the quality of the output, 
irrespective of the firm being an exporting firm or producing for 
the domestic market. These results from the existing literature 
suggest that adding tariffs on the imported inputs will not only 
adversely affect the quality, employment and number of products 
of the firms in exporting sector but also of the domestic firms.
4. Policies for technological upgrading
Technological upgrading is an important part of the convergence 
process. Developing countries that are integrated into the global 
economy generally have had more rapid total factor productivity 
growth – our best way to measure technological advance – than 
the already developed economies. Developed economies are at 
the frontier and have to invent new technologies, which is costly 
and difficult. Developing countries can absorb already existing 
FIGURE 7.7 Relationship between per capita GDP and the provincial VA rate of exports
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technologies through direct foreign investment and learning. 
As they progress, it is natural for developing countries to begin 
spending resources on inventing new technologies so the more 
advanced developing economies are both absorbing existing 
technologies and innovating new ones.
We have seen earlier in this chapter that, at certain stages 
of development, technological advance goes hand-in-hand 
with higher domestic value added content of exports. We see 
the causality here running from technological advance to GVC 
structure, not from domestic content to technological advance. 
The reason for this conclusion is that, for Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, and Chinese Taipei, as well as for the other technologi-
cally advanced economies such as Germany and the U.S., the 
clear trend is for DVAR to fall. The most advanced technological 
economies are all extremely open, capitalist economies. Firms 
are choosing in competitive markets which inputs – goods and 
services – to source locally and which to source internationally. 
The result in all of these economies is more international sourc-
ing over time.
We conclude from these patterns that it is reasonable for 
a developing economy to aspire to more rapid technological 
advance, which will contribute to higher living standards both 
directly and indirectly (because technological advance raises 
the return to investment and encourages capital accumulation). 
In certain periods, this may lead to an increase in the DVAR, 
but in the long run it is likely to lead to declines in DVAR as has 
been witnessed in all of the advanced economies. It is an easy 
mistake for developing countries to see the causality going the 
other way. If all else were equal, then increasing DVAR would 
mean more total value added and typically higher productiv-
ity. The problem with this thinking is all else will not be equal. 
Firms in competitive economies source goods and services 
internationally if they are superior in quality and/or lower cost. 
If a country artificially induces firms to source locally, it will 
reduce their competitiveness and lead to less total value added 
and productivity. From a policy point of view then, developing 
countries should encourage technological advance but remain 
indifferent to whether inputs are sourced locally or internation-
ally. That is a choice best left to the firm. There are policies that 
countries can use to encourage technological innovation, such 
as support for STEM (science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics) education, subsidies to R&D, intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPR) protection, and openness to foreign trade and 
investment.
The leading countries in the world producing STEM gradu-
ates are now China and India. In 2016 China produced almost 
5 million STEM graduates (undergraduate and graduate com-
bined), and India, nearly 3 million (Figure 7.8). This was far in 
excess of the 568,000 graduated in the U.S. Russia, Iran, and 
Indonesia also produced significant STEM graduates. This 
increasing pool of technical labor in emerging markets naturally 
encourages hi-tech industries to expand there, including the 
establishment of research centers. Aside from quantity of grad-
uates, there is also the important issue of quality. Most of the 
top research universities in the world are in the U.S. and West-
ern Europe, but Chinese and Indian universities are starting to 
climb the ranks. In 2018, 43 of the top 100 research universities 
in the world were in the U.S., followed by Continental Europe, 
Australia and Canada (Figure 7.9). China came next. The highest 
ranked universities from China were Peking University (#27) and 
Tsinghua University (#30). No Indian university has yet cracked 
the top 100.
FIGURE 7.8 Countries with the most STEM graduates (2016)
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Emerging markets in general still spend very little on 
research and development. India, despite its success in certain 
hi-tech areas, spends only about half a percent of GDP on R&D. 
In fact, most emerging markets do not even report consistent 
data on R&D because it is such a small part of their economies. 
China is the notable exception. As recently as 2001 China spent 
less than 1% of GDP on R&D, but that figure has been climbing 
steadily in recent years and in 2015 China spent more than 2% 
(Figure 7.10). The advanced economies generally spend between 
2 and 3% of GDP on R&D, and China has now joined that club. 
In both China and the U.S., about one-fifth of R&D is financed 
by the government, with the rest primarily coming from industry. 
This reveals that it is difficult for the government to have much 
direct effect on R&D. Subsidies, usually in the form on tax breaks, 
play some role. But, in general, R&D is based on corporate deci-
sions which are influenced by availability of technical labor and 
other aspects of the policy environment.
One of the most important aspects of the policy environment for 
R&D is intellectual property rights protection. Since the vast major-
ity of R&D funding comes from industry, it is aimed at developing 
commercial innovations – new technologies for providing goods 
and services. The logic of IPR protection is to provide a temporary 
monopoly for the innovator. This is necessary to create a financial 
incentive to innovate. If innovations could be instantly copied, then 
there would be no incentive for R&D. On the other hand, once inno-
vations exist it is socially optimal for them to diffuse, and for that 
reason IPR protection tends to be temporary and imperfect, allow-
ing reasonable offshoots to develop quickly. One of the striking 
differences between the advanced economies and emerging mar-
kets is in the quality of IPR protection. All of the top innovative 
economies score very highly on an index of IPR protection from the 
Intellectual Property Rights Alliance (Figure 7.11). Emerging markets 
such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa 
lag well behind. For countries like China that have made progress 
with the inputs of innovation, such as STEM graduates and R&D 
spending, improving IPR protection should be a key priority in order 
to get the greatest innovation output from the effort.
The most technologically advanced countries have seen their 
DVARs decline in recent years as they make proportionally more 
use of imported inputs. These economies also tend to have large 
shares of services in their exported value added. This rising 
service share reflects two factors: first, there is growing service 
content embodied in manufactured products, such as software 
in automobiles and appliances; second, as value chains become 
more fragmented, services such as finance, telecom, and trans-
port are increasingly important in managing value chains. Given 
these trends, it is not surprising that the most technologically 
advanced countries tend to be very open to trade and invest-
ment in services. In these sectors trade and investment tend to 
go together because it is hard to trade most services without an 
investment presence.
The OECD calculates a direct investment restrictiveness index 
for whole economies and for particular sectors. The advanced 
economies that make up the OECD are open in virtually all sec-
tors. Emerging markets, on the other hand, tend to be fairly 
open in manufacturing but still somewhat closed in services such 
FIGURE 7.9 Top 100 world research universities, by area (2018)
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as telecom and finance (Figure 7.12). This is particularly true for 
China, which overall is the most closed among major emerging 
markets. Countries such as India and Indonesia are not as closed 
as China, but far from OECD levels. Argentina, Brazil, and South 
Africa all tend to be more open. In the case of China, there is 
firm-level evidence that the closed service sectors have low pro-
ductivity levels and growth rates. Hence, the protected strategy 
consigns China to poor-quality services that then make it more 
difficult for other sectors, including manufacturing, to reach 
international quality. 
FIGURE 7.11 IPR protection index (2018)
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FIGURE 7.10 R&D as a share of GDP (2015)
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Concerns that China is not as open as other major economies 
have been compounded by the Made in China 2025 program. 
This plan, from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technol-
ogy (MIIT), aims to transform China into a hi-tech powerhouse 
and focuses on ten industries:
• Artificial intelligence and quantum computing
• Automated machine tools and robotics
• Aerospace
• Maritime equipment
• Modern rail transport equipment
• Self-driving and new energy vehicles
• Power equipment
• Agricultural equipment
• New materials
• Biopharma and advanced medicine
MIIT’s plans call for rising domestic content for these sectors. 
Other Chinese officials emphasize that these are indicative, not 
mandatory targets. Mandatory domestic content requirements 
would be a WTO violation. The IMF discussed these issues with 
Chinese authorities during the 2018 Article IV consultation: “The 
authorities stressed that their plan to develop strategic sectors 
would be market-based…. The authorities clarified that the gov-
ernment did not set mandatory targets for domestic content…. 
They emphasized that domestic and foreign companies would 
be treated equally in China’s effort to update ins industrial 
sector, noting that industrial policies needed to be market-ori-
ented.” (p. 22)
Still the Made in China 2025 program, along with China’s 
ongoing investment restrictions, have created some confusion 
about the direction of policy. China is likely to get the most out of 
its impressive investment in STEM students and R&D if it opens 
the remaining sectors of the economy and continues to improve 
IPR protection. If, alternatively, it tries to artificially pump up the 
domestic content of favored sectors, that is likely to be a recipe 
for slow technological advance and ongoing trade conflicts.
Every economy in the world has an opportunity to join GVCs 
irrespective of the type of human and physical capital available 
in the economy. If the domestic economy has relatively higher 
skilled workers like Singapore or Hong Kong, China, they will join 
the GVCs at higher value-added segment like designing or high-
end services (like marketing, financial etc.). On the contrary, if the 
economy has relatively more unskilled workers, it would join the 
GVCs in lower value added segments like assembly and pack-
aging. Even if the economy joins at the lower value-added seg-
ment, it still helps the economy to generate more and better job 
opportunities for the unskilled workers. Every country needs to 
assess how skilled (or unskilled) the workforce is, which region 
it is located in and what comparative advantage it can exploit 
to join the GVCs in a specific sector. Once it is integrated, to 
enhance the value-addition (or move up the value-chain), follow-
ing the Chinese example, the domestic economy needs to invest 
in upskilling workers, R&D and technology adoption by firms, as 
well as supporting ICT and physical infrastructure by convert-
ing comparative advantage into competitive advantage. If the 
FIGURE 7.12 FDI restrictiveness index for manufacturing, telecom, and financial services (2018)
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economy tries to increase the DVA in exports by artificially sup-
porting the inputs/intermediates by using tariffs and non-tariff 
measures, it will increase the cost of production and make the 
product less competitive in the international market, resulting 
in reduced demand for the product as well as workers in the 
exporting sector and will also affect the productivity and quality 
of the domestic firms as well, adversely affecting the welfare in 
the society. 
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Notes
1. It is common practice to present the aggregate trend for domestic 
content in exports, and then for manufacturing as most trade take 
place in this sector. Following Johnson and Noguera (2016), the total 
economy is grouped into four categories, Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing, Non-Manufacturing Industrial Production, Manufacturing, 
and Services.
2. Though, this difference in policy is not the only reason for poor 
exporting performance by Pakistan but one of the primary reasons. 
During the same period, Pakistan experienced many security issues 
and crippling power outages.
3. We are using 2014 as it is the latest year in GTAP (version 10) data-
base, recording the data for these two economies
4. The aggregate DVA for Bangladesh (67.6%) is also lower as compared 
to Pakistan (82.6%) despite having higher total exports as well.
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